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Abstract: Although attributions about others’ sad emotions have been shown to be positively related to helping behavior,
there have been considerable inconsistencies in the findings. This study was designed to investigate the relations of
affective attributions, affective reconciliations, and cognitive perspective-taking measures to prosocial behavior. Eightynine preschool through second grade children were administered various social cognition indices (two affective and one
cognitive); the children were then given an opportunity to help a same-sex confederate child obtain toys. Helping that
required a specific form of affective attribution and reconciliation was significantly related to the affective attribution and
reconciliation measures when the demands required by the helping opportunity “matched” the social cognition measure
demands. The findings are discussed in terms of the need to reconceptualize the relations between social cognitive skills
and helping.
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Another potential explanation for the inconsistent findings
is that perspective-taking measures sometimes may not have
tapped cognitive abilities relevant to the prosocial behavior
being assessed. If this were true, the pattern of relations
across studies would be expected to vary as a function of the
relevance of the perspective-taking measure used.
This investigation is based on the proposition that
there are different types of sociocognitive skills and that a
measure of a specific sociocognitive skill will be consistently
related to a prosocial behavior only if that behavior requires
that specific type of social cognition. Thus, attributions
and reasoning about others’ emotions would be expected
to result in prosocial behavior only to the extent that the
behavior in question would be expected to be facilitated by
an understanding of the relevant affective cues or process
(Eisenberg, 1986). For example, attributions about another’s
affective state may be associated with helping in a situation
that requires processing of affective cues, such as when a
needy other looks sad or is in distress. Similarly reasoning
about inconsistent cues related to affect (e.g., contradictory
facial and situational cues) may be associated with helping in
situations that require reconciling such inconsistencies, such
as when a needy other does not display sad facial affect. In
contrast, cognitive perspective-taking measures that require
an awareness that another’s knowledge may differ from one’s
own (e.g., Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968, cartoon
story task) may not be associated with helping in situations
involving overt affective cues because these measures do not
require coordinating affective cues.

Developmental researchers have frequently theorized
about and investigated the possible cognitive antecedents
of prosocial behaviors. One such antecedent is perspective
taking, the ability or tendency to differentiate another’s view
from one’s own. Measures of perspective taking have assessed
the individual’s evaluation of the perceptual, cognitive, and
affective cues that differentiate between others and self as
well as the tendency or ability to shift or achieve balance
between those cues (Shantz, 1975). Thus, perspective taking
has been conceptualized as a global skill, so that, in general,
higher levels of perspective taking have been expected to be
associated with prosocial behavior.
Despite these theoretically based expectations, the
observed empirical relations between perspective taking
and prosocial behaviors have been relatively inconsistent
(Eisenberg, 1986; Iannotti, 1985; Kurdek, 1978; Underwood
& Moore, 1982), even though a significant low positive
association has been demonstrated using meta-analytic
procedures (Underwood & Moore, 1982). The only empirical
investigations that have examined the cause of these
inconsistencies (Denham, 1986; Iannotti, 1985) involved a
battery-of-measures approach. For example, Denham (1986)
found a positive relation between an aggregate measure of
helping and an aggregate measure of affective perspective
taking, whereas Iannotti (1985) found a positive relation
between an aggregate prosocial behavior measure and an
affective perspective-taking measure. Thus, on the basis of
these findings, these researchers concluded that affective
perspective taking is a precursor to helping behaviors.
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Recently, researchers have begun to focus on subtle
differences in the cognitive demands of various social cognition
measures (e.g., Gnepp, 1983; Hoffner & Badzinski, 1989;
Saarni, 1979). Using picture-story measures in which sad or
happy facial and situational cues are depicted, investigators
have examined young children’s abilities to identify affective
cues and to reconcile conflicting affective cues. These
investigators have found that young children preferentially
attend to facial cues, that there is increasing attention to
situational cues with age, and that the accuracy of report of
both positively and negatively valenced cues increases with
age (e.g., Iannotti, 1978; Kurdek & Rogdon, 1975; Shantz,
1975). There is also evidence that young children can attend
to both facial and situational affective cues and that this ability
and the ability to reconcile incongruent cues increases with
age (e.g., Gnepp, 1983; Gnepp, McKee, & Domanic, 1987;
Reichenbach & Masters, 1983; Saarni, 1979).
The ability to infer others’ emotional states has
traditionally been considered to be a prerequisite to empathy
as well as a facilitator of some types of prosocial responding,
such as altruism (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 1984;
Shantz, 1975). However, in a situation in which the cues
indicating a need for help are vague or apparently conflicting
(e.g., when one is not sure whether someone wants or needs
help, perhaps because of an incongruence between the
situation and the other’s facial expression), children may help
only if they are capable of reconciling the incongruent cues.
In contrast, in a situation in which the facial and situational
cues are congruent and salient, children’s helping may vary
as a function of their ability to accurately interpret another’s
sad cues. Furthermore, individual and group differences in
attributions and reasoning about others’ affective states could
account for individual and group differences in helping
when such behavior specifically requires a specific type of
attribution or reasoning about others’ affects.
The measures of social cognition and prosocial behavior
used in this study were selected so that the type of social
cognition assessed matched the sociocognitive processing
required by the prosocial behavior in which children could
engage (Eisenberg, 1986; Kurdek, 1978). Attributions of
sadness in situations with congruent sad facial and sad
situational cues were expected to be positively related to
helping in a similar context. Similarly, reconciliations about
affect in a context in which the facial and situational cues
were incongruent or conflicting (i.e., one type of cue was
positive, whereas the other was negative) were expected
to be associated with helping in a similar context. Finally,
children’s responses to a cognitive perspective-taking task
that did not focus on the processing of facial and situational
affective cues were not expected to be significantly correlated
with helping in the above-mentioned contexts.
Method
Subjects
Participants were 89 preschool through second grade children
(mean age = 81.1 months, SD = 16.7). Because social cognition
skills are believed to undergo a qualitative transformation around
seven years of age (Shantz, 1975) and to ease interpretation of the
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results, children were grouped into two age groups: up to 7 years of
age and 7 years of age or older. Mean ages of the older and young
groups were 96.4 and 68.7 months, respectively. There were 20
older boys, 20 older girls, 30 young boys, and 19 young girls. The
participants attended a child study laboratory/day-care center or one
of two elementary schools in a middle-class community in the same
general area as the day care center.

Apparatus and Materials
The experimental room contained a color monitor on a table,
two chairs facing the table, and a one-way mirror; under the mirror
was a crank handle attached to a box on the wall. The child was
videotaped through the one-way mirror during the administration of
the social cognition tasks and during the helping task.
Affective attribution and reasoning task. The affective
attribution and reasoning task (adapted slightly from Iannotti, 1978)
consisted of 12 randomly ordered black and white photographs
mounted on paper (the sex of the child in the picture was matched
to the sex of the participant) and corresponding stories. There were
six congruent stories (two sad, two happy, one angry, and one afraid)
in which the facial expression and the situational cues in the story
were consistent (e.g., both cues were sad or both cues were happy).
In addition, there were six incongruent stories (four that included
mixed sad and happy cues and two that included mixed angry and
afraid cues) in which the facial expression and the situational cues
were conflicting (e.g., there were two stories with a happy face in a
sad situation and two stories with a sad face in a happy situation).
A choice sheet (one set for each sex) displaying line drawings
of eight facial expressions was used to assess affective attributions.
There were four pairs of faces randomly ordered on the sheet. The
paired faces portrayed happy-very happy, sad-very sad, angry-very
angry, and afraid-very afraid affective expressions. In addition, there
was one neutral facial expression (labeled “nothing at all”). Before
presenting the stories and after each story, the experimenter pointed
to each of the faces on the choice sheet and labeled each one. After
the third example, the experimenter discontinued labeling if it was
clear that the child understood the faces.
For each story, the picture depicting the events in the short story
was covered with a sheet of paper as the experimenter read the story.
The picture was revealed at a prompt (as designed by Iannotti, 1978)
during the middle of the story. The children were then asked to indicate
how they felt, how the character in the story felt (affect attribution),
and how they knew the protagonist felt that way (affect reasoning).
The children were required to indicate their choice on the facial choice
sheet by pointing, even if they verbalized the emotions to the first two
questions. The third question required a verbal response.1
Cognitive perspective-taking task. The stimulus materials
for the cognitive perspective-taking task consisted of seven color
drawings that depicted a story. With these cards (see Flavell et
al., 1968, Task ID), children were told the story of a boy who was
chased by a dog, ran away from the dog, saw an apple tree, climbed
up the tree until the dog went away and started eating an apple. They
1 The affective match between the children’s reported affect and
that of the story protagonist (using both the first and the second questions
that were asked; Iannotti, 1978) was also coded. Results indicated no
significant zero-order or partial correlations (controlling for both age and
sex simultaneously) between empathic-like responses and helping in either
of the two conditions; rs ranged from –.23 to .22, except that matching sad
affect in the congruent picture stories was positively related to helping in the
congruent helping condition, r = .39, p < .05, when both age and sex were
partialed out. However, some researchers have seriously questioned whether
picture-story-type measures are valid indicators of empathy (Eisenberg &
Lennon, 1983; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Strayer & Schroeder, 1989).
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were asked to repeat the story back to the experimenter to ensure
understanding. If children failed to indicate the purpose of the dog
during his or her narration, he or she was asked why the boy climbed
the tree and what the dog was doing in the picture that depicted the
boy in the tree and the dog leaving (second to last picture). Next, the
children were told that they were going to show an imagined friend
four pictures (out of the seven) that did not show the dog chasing
the boy up the tree. The children were asked what story they thought
their friend would tell. If a child failed to spontaneously mention that
the dog had chased the boy, the experimenter asked why their friend
would think the boy climbed the tree and why their friend would
think the dog was there. The children were assumed to be taking the
imaginary peer’s perspective if they realized that their peer would
not know that the dog chased the boy up the tree (as was the case in
the longer version of the story). This measure was deemed to be an
index of a social cognition skill that was irrelevant to helping in our
experimental context because this task did not concern the relation
between facial and situational affective cues.

Procedure and Helping Task
After a same-sex experimenter administered the affective
attribution and reasoning task and the cognitive perspective-taking
task in a counterbalanced order, the children were given an opportunity
to help another child. Experimenters were unaware of the hypotheses
of the study, unaware of how the social cognition measures were to
be scored, and unaware of the condition to which the child had been
assigned until they were presented with the helping task. Children
were assigned (counterbalanced) to one of two helping conditions
(see condition description below). All children were allowed to
turn the crank attached to the wall, to show how hard it was to turn.
The children then viewed a 4 min videotape showing a same-sex
(male model’s age = 57 months; female model’s age = 60 months)
confederate (Johnnie or Susie). The confederate child wore a plaster
hand cast that reached to his or her elbow. He or she was shown
walking to a crank with a same-sex adult. The adult then left and the
confederate child began turning the crank (from this point on, only the
confederate’s head, shoulders and moving arms could be seen).
All children were told that the confederate child on the TV
was in another room at the same time and that the confederate child
was going to turn a crank similar to the one in the subject’s room.
The children were told that the confederate child was from another
class just like theirs, that he or she was turning the crank to get
some toys, and that the faster the crank was turned, the more toys
the confederate child would receive. Children were told that if they
turned the crank, it would make it easier for the confederate child to
get more toys because it would make the crank turn faster (for similar
tasks, see Liebert & Baron, 1972; Mallick & McCandless, 1966). The
experimenter reiterated this information if necessary. The children
were also told that they could see the confederate child on the TV but
that the confederate could not see them. In the incongruent condition,
the confederate in the film was smiling throughout the whole tape
even though the crank was hard to turn. In the congruent condition, the
confederate was frowning and looked frustrated. In both conditions,
the confederate child paused and said (30 s into the film), “Boy, this
is hard, especially with a broken hand”, after which the experimenter
said, “I guess that is hard, with a broken hand. Anyway, I have to
get something, I’ll be back in a couple of minutes. You can watch
[Johnny/Susie] or you can turn the handle [the experimenter turned
the handle a couple of times to lessen any inhibitions] or do whatever
you want.” The experimenter left the room and returned after 90 s.

Coding Procedure
Affective attribution and reasoning task. Responses to only the
happy and sad stories were coded because these were affectively

relevant to the prosocial behavior. Furthermore, because the children
seemed rarely to distinguish affective intensity in their responding,
we collapsed their responses across the two affective levels.
Separate scores were obtained for the congruent and incongruent
stories. For the congruent stories, attributions were coded as I for
reference to any sad (sad or very sad) or any happy (happy or very
happy) affect if the attribution of how the character felt matched
the affective cues in the story. All other responses were coded as 0.
Scores were summed across stories depicting the same affect (two
happy and two sad stories), producing both sad and happy attribution
scores. The total score for sad attributions (alpha = .50) or happy
attributions (alpha = .37) ranged from 0 to 2 (alphas of .50 or above
are often considered adequate for 2- or 4-item scales, especially if
the hypothesized relations are significant; Nunnally, 1967).
For the incongruent stories, reconciliations were coded as
I for any happy or any sad attribution of how the character felt
that acknowledged the incongruent affective cues and discounted
one of those affective cues (e.g., “He’s sad because he didn’t get
the birthday presents that he wanted” or “She’s sad even though
she’s smiling:’). All other responses were coded as 0. There were
four possible reconciliation indices (using a specific sad or happy
affect in combination with the facial or situational cue). However,
because only 20% of the responses (out of 356 possible responses)
were reconciliations and because some of the specific reconciliation
indices occurred relatively infrequently, these indices were
summed to derive a total reconciliation score (alpha = .55; total
reconciliation scores ranged from 0 to 4). Codings of reconciliations
were not appropriate for the congruent stories because these stories
contained consistent facial and situational affective cues. Because
reconciliations in the incongruent stories required that children
indicate the story character’s emotional state, attributions were not
coded separately for these stories.
Interrater agreement on the 22% of the cases coded by
two independent naive judges was 100% for attributions for the
congruent stories and 91% for reconciliations for the incongruent
stories. Disagreements were resolved by discussion.
Cognitive perspective-taking task. Responses to the cartoon
story task were coded using an adaptation of the scoring procedures
of Flavell et al. (1968). A score of 1 was assigned if (a) the subject
did not spontaneously mention or indicate when probed that the dog
played a role in the boy’s climbing the tree and (b) no fear motive
was mentioned. All other responses were scored as 0. The correlation
between responses coded according to this modified coding scheme
and those coded according to Flavell et al.’s (1968) original coding
scheme was significant, r(84) = .79, p < .001, two-tailed. Three
subjects’ scores could not be computed because of difficulty in
hearing the videotapes. Interrater agreement was 92% on the 23%
of the cases coded by two independent naive judges.
Helping task. In order to obtain a measure that reflected
qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions of helping, three
helping indices were coded separately from the videotapes by two
independent naive judges. The two quantitative indices were the
number of seconds the subject turned the crank and the number of
revolutions of the crank. The qualitative index was a 7-point rating
(from no effort to a lot of effort) of subjects’ effort while they turned
the crank. The interrater reliability on 22% of the cases was 100%
agreement for the number of turns, r = .99 for time turning the handle
and r = .81 for effort. Disagreements were resolved by discussion.

Results
Affective Attributions and Reconciliations and Cognitive
Perspective Taking
Interrelations among the scores. Sad attribution scores
in the congruent stories were unrelated to happy attribution
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scores in these stories, and both sad and happy attributions
were unrelated to reconciliation scores in the incongruent
stories, rs(87) = –.01 and .19, both ns. respectively.
Correlational analyses also indicated that the cartoon story
task was significantly related to sad attribution scores in the
congruent stories, r(84) = .29, p < .01, two-tailed. However,
this relation became nonsignificant when age was partialed out,
r = .18. There were no other significant relations between the
cartoon story task and the happy attribution or the reconciliation
measures, rs (84) = .01 and .12, ns, respectively.
Age and gender differences. To assess age and gender
differences in the attribution scores derived from the congruent
stories, a 2 (age) × 2 (sex) × 2 (valence: happy; sad) unique
sums-of-squares analysis of variance (ANOVA) with valence
as a repeated factor was performed. There were significant
main effects of age, F(1,85) = 11.81, p < .01, and valence,
F(1,85) = 19.77, p < .001. Older children correctly reported
sad and happy emotions combined (M = 3.83, SD = .39) more
often than did young children (M = 3.37, SD = .73), and the
children reported more happy (M = 1.94, SD = .23) than sad (M
= 1.63, SD = .59) emotions. There also was a significant Age ×
Valence interaction, F(1, 85) = 10.85, p < .01. Tests of simple
effects indicated that older children reported sad emotions
more often than did young children, F(1,85) = 18.59, p < .001
(for older children, M = 1.88, SD = .33; for young children, M
= 1.43, SD = .68), whereas there were no age differences for
happy attributions. No other effects were significant.
To assess age and gender differences in the reconciliation
scores derived from the incongruent stories, we performed an
additional 2 (age) × 2 (sex) unique sums-of-squares ANOVA.
There were no significant effects, even though the older
children did reconcile the incongruent cues somewhat more
often than did the young children (for older children, M =
2.13, SD = 1.11; for young children, M = 1.84, SD = 1.21).
Similarly, a 2 (age) × 2 (sex) unique sums-of-squares ANOVA
was performed to assess age and gender differences on the
cartoon story task. There was a significant main effect for age
(for young children, M = .09, SD = .29; for older children, M
= .40, SD = .50), F(1, 82) = 11.99, p < .001, and a significant
main effect for gender (for boys, M= .13, SD = .33; for girls,
M= .37, SD = .49), F(1, 82) = 6.33, p < .01. Older children
and girls scored higher on this type of social cognition.
Helping Measure
We performed a 2 (age) × 2 (sex) × 2 (helping condition)
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to assess the
effects of age, sex, and helping condition on the number of
turns, time turning, and effort indices. There was a significant
multivariate main effect of age, F(2, 80) = 3.11, p < .05 (for
older children, Ms = 25.78, 8.80, and 4.15, SDs = 30.25, 10.57,
and 2.44; for young children, Ms = 37.27, 8.67, and 4.59, SDs
= 33.37, 10.13, and 2.48, for time turning, number of turns,
and effort, respectively). However, the univariate analyses
were not significant. There were no other significant effects.
Relations Between Helping and the Affective Attribution,
Reconciliation. and Cognitive Perspective-Taking Scores
The zero-order relations and the partial correlations
(controlling for both sex and age) between helping and the

459

attribution and reconciliation measures are presented in Table
1 (we computed one-tailed significance tests for the significant
correlations because these relations were hypothesized a
priori). To reduce the total number of possible correlations
while still examining the hypothesized relations, we formed
a composite index of helping. The composite was the sum
of the standardized number of turns and the standardized
number of seconds turning (r = .80, p < .001, between these
two indices) multiplied by the effort score. Conceptually, this
index weighed the amount of helping by the amount of effort
expended in helping.2
As can be seen in Table 1, the pattern of correlations
was consistent with the hypotheses. Sad attributions in the
congruent stories were positively related to helping in the
congruent condition, and reconciliations were positively
related to helping in the incongruent condition. There
were no significant relations between congruent attribution
measures and helping in the incongruent condition, nor were
there significant relations between reconciliations for the
incongruent stories and helping in the congruent condition.
Furthermore, the correlations between the sad attribution
measure and helping in the congruent versus the incongruent
conditions were significantly different, Z = 2.10, p < .05,
one-tailed; the correlations between the reconciliation
measure and helping in the congruent versus the incongruent
conditions were marginally different, Z = 1.55, p < .06, onetailed. Finally, the cartoon story task was unrelated to helping
in the congruent and the incongruent conditions, rs = -.17 and
.10, both ns. respectively.
Because we were concerned about violations of the
normal distribution assumptions, we conducted analyses using
arcsine transformations of the affective and the cognitive
perspective-taking scores and reciprocal transformations
of the helping measure; these analyses produced the same
results. Also, the correlation between helping and the cartoon
story task using the original coding scheme of Flavell et al.
(1968) was nonsignificant.3
Discussion
In general, our findings supported the hypothesis that
measures of social cognition are related to helping scores
primarily when helping would be expected to be facilitated
by the specific form of social cognition (Eisenberg, 1986;
Kurdek, 1978). Specifically, children who made sad
attributions in the congruent stories helped more in the
congruent helping condition than did children who did not
make sad attributions. In contrast, children who reconciled
the conflicting cues in the incongruent stories helped more in
the incongruent helping condition. As expected, scores on the
2 A 2 (age) × 2 (sex) × 2 (helping condition) ANOVA on the helping
composite revealed no significant effects.
3 The relations between the social cognition measures and number of
seconds turning, number of turns, and effort (as separate indices of helping)
were also examined. In the congruent condition, sad attributions were
significantly (p < .05), positively related to number of turns, r = .25, and
to both number of turns and number of seconds turning when both age and
sex were partialed out, rs = .39 and .32, respectively. In the incongruent
condition, reconciliations were significantly, positively related to each
helping index even when age and sex were both partialed out; rs ranged
from .27 to .35.
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Table I
Relations and Partial Correlations Between Helping and Attributions
and Reconciliations

Sociocognitive
measures
Sad attributions
Happy attributions
Reconciliations

Congruent helping
(n = 44)
r
.28*
.11
.01

Incongruent
helping (n = 45)

Partial rs

r

.45**
.11
.04

–.17
.14
.34**

Partial rs
–.20
.11
.31*

Note. Attributions were coded from the congruent stories, and
reconciliations were coded from the incongruent stories. Partial
correlations (partial rs) were controlled for both sex and age.
* p < .05, one-tailed. ** p < .01, one-tailed.

measures derived from the congruent stories were not
related to helping in the incongruent helping condition,
and measures derived from the incongruent stories were
not related to helping in the congruent helping condition.
In addition, as expected, attributions and reasoning about
affect were positively related to helping that required
assessment of another’s emotional state, whereas a cognitive
perspective-taking task that did not focus on affective cues
was unrelated to helping that required processing of affective
cues (Denham, 1986; Eisenberg, 1986; Kurdek, 1978).
The present findings also suggest that there may be
other cognitive abilities related to helping in addition to
perspective taking. That is, the ability to reconcile conflicting
affective cues, a cognitive ability beyond identifying the
cues, was positively related to helping when the helping
context included incongruent cues. This finding is consistent
with other evidence of the importance of cognitive abilities
other than perspective taking in social behaviors (e.g., Brady,
Newcomb, & Hartup, 1983; Chao, Knight, & Dubro, 1986;
Knight, Berning, Wilson, & Chao, 1987; Knight, Bohlmeyer,
Schneider, & Harris, 1990). Past inconsistencies in the
observed empirical relations between perspective taking and
prosocial behaviors may be partially the result of variability in
these additional cognitive prerequisites. For example, in some
studies, a mismatch between the cognitive demands inherent
in a prosocial behavior measure and those in a perspectivetaking measure may have resulted in underestimates of the
expected pattern of the relation between these underlying
constructs. Thus, it may be necessary to consider a range of
potential cognitive prerequisites when hypothesizing about
the role of cognitive development in prosocial behaviors.
Future investigations using the present approach are
needed to validate the present findings in naturalistic settings.
Furthermore, consideration of the relations of different
sociocognitive abilities to prosocial behaviors (e.g., moral
reasoning), abilities that have been hypothesized to relate
significantly to helping, may be enhanced from using the
present approach. For example, specific forms of moral
reasoning (e.g., sympathetic-type reasoning, that is, reasoning
pertaining to feeling concerned for another) may be positively
associated with helping in situations that specifically require
reasoning about affect (Eisenberg, 1986). Nevertheless, the
findings of this study support the assertion that specific forms
of helping require specific forms of social cognition.

In addition to matching cognitive demands, it also is
necessary to consider motivational processes in explaining
individual differences in helping (Eisenberg, 1986; Knight et
al., 1987). That is, although a child may have the cognitive
abilities underlying both a given social cognition measure
and a helping measure, the child may not be motivated to use
that cognitive skill in the helping situation; or, having used
that cognitive skill in the helping situation and knowing that
another is in need of help, the child may elect not to help. This
motivational gap between knowledge and behavior no doubt
accounts, in part, for the fact that sociocognitive abilities are
at best only moderately associated with prosocial behavior.
Nonetheless, sociocognitive skills, such as attributions and
reasoning about affect, may frequently be a prerequisite for
prosocial actions based on moral principles or empathy-based
emotional responding (Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, 1984;
Underwood & Moore, 1982) and are therefore important for
an understanding of altruistic behaviors.
The magnitude of the relations observed in this study may
also have been attenuated by the reliability of the measures.
As has been the case in previous research, the social cognition
measures used in this study included few items. However, the
reliabilities of two of the key social cognition measures (the
sad attribution and the reconciliation measures) were quite
adequate for 2- and 4-item scales. Furthermore, the consistent
pattern of relations between social cognitions and helping
suggests some reliability and construct validity. In previous
studies, researchers have attempted to increase the reliability
of indices of social cognition by aggregating several indices
(Denham, 1986; Iannotti, 1985). However, the results of this
study suggest that such an approach increases the magnitude
and consistency of relations between social cognition
measures and social behavior primarily when there is a match
between the specific cognitive requirements of the multiple
sociocognitive measures and the social behavior measures.
There were a few interesting age differences in
responses to the affective attribution and helping measures.
The age differences in affective attributions were consistent
with previous evidence that young children avoid sad cues
and prefer to report happy emotions and that older children
explain affect more than do young children (Glasberg &
Aboud, 1982; Gnepp, 1983; Hoffner & Badzinski, 1989;
Iannotti, 1978; Kurdek & Rogdon, 1975; Saarni, 1979).
However, the age differences in helping in this study were
very weak, perhaps because of the narrow age range sampled.
It is possible that age differences in affective attributions and
reasoning could account for age differences in helping (e.g.,
Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983) in a wider
age-range sample if the specific form of helping required
these cognitive processes.
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